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ABSTRACT 
By understanding how the over-round is constructed, this work draws a parallel between 
financial and sport betting markets, where the over-rounds work analogously to bid-ask 
spreads in stock exchanges. As in financial markets, when the probability of facing better 
informed investors increases, bookmakers increase the over-rounds or market spreads in 
sport betting markets. In this sense, assuming that in the WTA circuit the adverse selection 
costs are higher than in the ATP circuit, the paper examines if over-rounds in WTA games 
are higher than in ATP games. The logic works as follows; if less information on WTA 
players is publicly available, is not unreasonable to think that the chances of confronting a 
better-informed bettor are higher for bookmakers in women’s tennis games (information 
asymmetries), leading us to believe that WTA games should exhibit higher spreads than ATP 
games. In short, the study confirms this hypothesis and it displays significant evidence 
suggesting that in professional women’s tennis games, bookmakers impose higher over-
rounds than in professional men’s tennis games. Furthermore, based on the study’s findings, 
the paper presents a concluding discussion on the wage gap between men and women 
professional tennis players. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The sport betting industry has suffered an unprecedented expansion during the last decade. 
The boom in online betting, together with scarce regulation in many countries and a huge 
investment in publicity, have exponentially increased its public, becoming addiction 
problems more and more common through the population. For sports’ fans, is not unusual 
to see how Cristiano Ronaldo, Rafael Nadal, or Neymar Jr. collaborate in numerous betting 
ads, encouraging viewers to bet in their next match.  
In the next lines, an attempt to combine the worlds of sport and finance has been made, 
making a brief overview of the industry and understanding how the “Over-round” is 
constructed in betting markets. In price-driven markets, when the probability of facing better 
informed investors increases, market-makers increase the bid-ask spread (the difference 
between the buying and selling price of a security or Over-round), with the intention of 
protecting themselves against huge loses.  
Analyzing the over-round differences between the games played by ATP and WTA players, 
and assuming that, among others, the WTA circuit creates less media attention, the level of 
compliance of financial theory in betting markets has been tested. It should be pointed out 
that WTA stands for Women’s Tennis Association, while ATP implies Association of Tennis 
Players (male players). So, if a significant over-round difference exists between men and 
women matches (higher over-round for women’s games), as long as we have considered that 
the probability to find investors better informed than bookmakers is higher in the WTA 
circuit, evidence will indicate that financial theory also applies in betting markets. Take into 
account that betting markets are comparable to price-driven markets, as market-makers have 
the duty to ensure market liquidity, determining quotes. 
In the past, other authors as Shin (1991) argued that bookmaker’s over-rounds can be 
interpreted as an analogy of the bid-ask spread in financial markets. The logic works as 
follows: Betting markets correspond to a market for contingent claims with n states. In this 
market, the value of the securities is determined by the betting odds (implied probabilities), 
and the sum of all the implied probabilities (all possible outcomes) should be equal to 1. So, 
if the sum of the implied probabilities is higher than one, an over-round or market spread 
exists (Coleman, 2007; Law and Peel, 2002), providing a clear, unambiguous, and an 
accessible measure of the size of the market spread. 
So, in the study, after a preliminary analysis of the data, three different econometric models 
have been constructed, in order to see if significant over-round differences exist among the 
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 1Data reflects betting volume from the quarterfinals to the final. See Appendix 1 for further results.  
econometric model for men, the econometric model for women, and the final model that 
encompasses both.  Results will be discussed in more detail in section [7], but in general, the 
models prove that ceteris paribus, significant over-round differences exist between men and 
women professional tennis games, being the spread higher for women matches. This result 
can be in part explained by the fact that less public information is available on women tennis 
players, especially for the ones that are outside the top 50. This increases the possibility of 
investors to have private information that escapes the knowledge of market-makers, 
increasing bookmakers’ expected mark-to-market loses, and in consequence, as it happens 
in financial markets, increasing the spread. Furthermore, as unsophisticated or passion 
investors are less frequent in WTA games, again, the chances of facing institutional and 
better-informed counterparties increase in women tennis. As an example, analyzing Betfair’s 
betting exchange data1, it can be seen that in Wimbledon 2016, although the total bet volume 
was considerably higher in men’s games (98,023,248.20 € against 53,041,054.94 €) the average 
bet size was higher in women’s matches (459.91€ against 415.89€). Hence, data suggests that 
the proportion of institutional investors in betting exchanges may be higher in women’s 
tennis matches. In this regard, Lin et al. (1995) re-examine the relationship between the trade 
size and the components of the bid ask spread, finding a positive relationship between the 
trade size and the adverse selection component.  
In short, it seems that in the WTA circuit, the adverse selection costs are higher than in the 
ATP circuit, being information asymmetries the most plausible cause to explain the 
difference. Remember that in financial theory, bid-ask spreads are affected by 3 main factors; 
inventory costs, operating expenses, and dealers’ risk of transacting with better-informed 
clients (Levin and Wright, 2004). In this sense, given that no stock must be kept in inventory 
when trading on probability, it could be assumed that for betting firms, inventory costs are 
equal to 0.  
This research contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, it proves that an over-
round difference exists between ATP and WTA games, and it cites higher information 
asymmetries as the most plausible explanation. Second, previous studies have documented 
major similarities between betting and financial markets, and this paper also contributes in 
this regard: As in financial markets (an increase in the spread could be observed), bookmakers 
increase the over-round when the chances of confronting better-informed counterparties 
increase.  
The paper is organized as follows. First, in section [2], an overview of the sport betting 
industry is made, analyzing, at the same time, which are the principal characteristics of price 
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and order-driven markets and how odds and prices are stablished in bookmaker’s markets. 
Second, in sections [3] and [4], an explanation is given to clarify which are the variables that 
influence price formation in betting markets, and continuedly, the main hypothesis of the 
research is presented. In the following sections (sections [5] and [6]), an overview of the 
dataset and the methodology is made, explaining the steps taken to contrast the ideas 
presented in previous sections. Third, in section [7], in order to obtain further evidence in 
favor of the hypothesis, a bunch of econometric models are estimated, together with the 
respective analysis of the results. To conclude with the study, the main findings, the final 
remarks, and the future research pathways are highlighted in section [8], finalizing with a 
closing discussion on the wage gap between men and women professional tennis players in 
section [9]. 
 
2. BETTING MARKETS 
2.1 Sport betting industry 
The sport betting industry, or the activity of trying to predict sporting outcomes and placing 
a positive economic quantity in the guess, has always been considered a social instrument. 
On the one hand, for high standing people, bets have been an excuse to foment social 
gatherings and interactions, and on the other hand, for low class people, gambling has been 
the easiest way to experience emotions and to target a new life. For example, betting was 
common in Ancient Rome, where people were used to place bets on chariot races or in 
combats between the fiercest gladiators. Nevertheless, the betting industry has always been 
a double-edged sword. Since the very beginning, social conflicts were common in casino’s 
areas, and people suffered from economic instability due to the high amounts of money that 
they spent in the casinos.  
In this situation, along with the creation of the first national lotteries, the most advanced 
nations of the world started to regulate the betting industry at the end of 18th century, in an 
attempt to obtain new revenue flows, to fairly distribute the prizes, and to take care of the 
public order and health (Schwartz, 2013). For example, in some countries like China and 
U.S.A., betting was restricted to certain areas (Macao and Las Vegas), but the legality of the 
activity was never put into question. In this sense, national regulatory differences have limited 
the ability of countries to result in a market segmentation, or at least, to define similar 
regulatory barriers, and in spite of agreements, legal niches have allowed sport betting firms 
to internationalized distribution (Gomber et al., 2008). 
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However, the real revolution in the sport betting industry took place recently, more 
concretely at the beginning of the 21st century, with the arrival of the internet. In fact, it was 
not until 2008 when sport betting firms obtained the first licenses to operate in the 
communities of Madrid and the Basque Country (Spain). Brindley (1999), already predicted 
that synergies between the gambling industry and the internet would change supply and 
consumption, due to the fact that in 1999, the sport betting markets were dominated by odds 
that were almost impossible to compare. In other words, due to physical distance, bettors 
only had access to one or two locations where bets could be placed. So, physical and time 
barriers restrained the capacity of the investment public to compare bookmarkers’ quotes, 
and in consequence, competition between betting firms was almost inexistent.  
In an online world, the betting industry has acquired the capacity to break unimaginable 
barriers and to connect with new publics, especially youth from 20 to 29 years who were 
inaccessible some years ago. Solely in Spain, the sport betting industry has more than 
multiplied its revenues in the last 6 years, and from 2012 onwards, it has experimented annual 
gain increases of 20% (Expansión, 2018). To put it into perspective, the volume of the sport 
betting industry in Spain in the year 2010 was 742 million euros, slightly lower than the annual 
revenue of Real Madrid, that consist on 750 million euros. 
Thanks to their aggressive marketing strategies, sport betting firms are able to increase its 
revenues year after year, and the prospects are even more promising. Betting firms are 
attracting more and more young public, betting on a game is not socially rejected, and thanks 
to their “live” distinctive characteristic (people have the possibility to bet on a game while 
they are seeing it), satisfaction is more intense.  However, the increase in sport betting 
volumes is raising some new concerns in the old continent, with Italy and Spain, for example, 
imposing more restricted regulatory norms regarding online betting.  
So, based on the relevance that the sport betting industry has right now, the aim of this work 
is to understand how the over-round evolves in betting markets, analyzing if significant 
differences exist among women and men tennis games. In a world where the sport betting 
industry is gradually gaining importance, research and empirical work are necessary for the 
correct understanding of the industry and to facilitate future regulation. With all the required 
humbleness, this work tries to row in that direction.    
2.2 Price and order-driven markets 
Price-driven markets, also known as quote-driven markets, are electronic stock exchange 
systems in which prices are determined from bid and ask quotations made by market-makers, 
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dealers, or specialists (Investopedia, 2018). Put another way, market-makers create the 
market by quoting, buying, and selling orders, and establishing the maximum quantity that 
they are willing to offer at the quoted price. In a quote-driven market, dealers fill orders from 
their own inventory or by matching them with other orders.  
On the other hand, order-driven markets are opposite to price-driven markets, as all buyers 
and sellers publicly display the prices at which they want to buy or sell a security and the 
desired quantity. In short, the main advantage that price-driven markets have over order-
driven markets is that order execution is guaranteed, as market-makers have the obligation 
to meet the quoted bid and ask prices (Demsetz, 1968). However, although less liquid, order-
driven markets are more transparent. As it has been mentioned, orders of both, buyers and 
sellers are publicly shown, and in consequence, all the market orders and the prices at which 
investors are hoping to buy or sell the security are displayed. 
Regarding betting markets, since the beginning of the 2000s, betting markets have been 
characterized by the coexistence of order-driven and price-driven markets (Flepp et al., 
2017). As in financial markets, in price-driven betting markets, market-makers operate on 
their account by betting odds at which bettor can place their bets (Croxson and Reade, 2013), 
whereas in order-driven betting markets, betting exchanges act as a market place in which 
buy or sell orders are matched in a continuous double auction. In other words, by 
guaranteeing liquidity at the odds placed, price-driven betting markets increase rapidity and 
reduce the gap that arises from the different arrival rate of buyers and sellers, while in order-
driven betting markets, liquidity is provided by the flow of orders from market participants 
(De Jong and Rindi, 2009). 
So, like market-makers in financial markets, in the betting industry, bookmakers (e.g. Bwin, 
Ladbrokers or William Hill) serve as intermediaries between the investors that want to place 
a bet on particular outcome (buyers), and the rest of the people that want to invest on the 
opposite result (sellers). Gomber et al. (2008) defined the bookmaker market model as a 
bilateral dealer market, where the bookmaker offers the traditional way to place a bet. In this 
extent, by determining the price at which they are willing to accept bets (on the outcome of 
certain sport event), bookmakers unilaterally determine the odds for a given outcome, and 
they earn a commission, which is known as the spread or the “Over-round” (Harris, 2003). 
The over-round, which is already priced into the odds, compensate them for providing 
liquidity and assuming the risk of an unfavorable outcome. So, in short, bookmaker’s markets 
are comparable to price-driven markets, as prices are established from quotes (bid-ask) made 
by market-makers. On the other hand, one significant difference between price-driven 
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financial and betting markets is that more information is available in sports betting markets. 
Rothschild described it in the following way: “While publicly available sports statistics are 
very deep, in financial markets there is more hidden, idiosyncratic information that investors 
have to gather” (Institutional investor, 2017). Furthermore, sport betting is purely organized 
“Over the Counter” (Gomber et al., 2008). Put another way, investor’s protection may be 
lower than in financial markets, as a centralized regulated market does not exist, and the 
trades are completed via a dealer’s network. 
Previous studies have obtained evidence suggesting that betting exchanges (order-driven 
markets) suffer less operational risk (Koning and Van Velzen, 2009), have a higher prediction 
accuracy in their odds (Franck et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2009), and bear lower information 
costs (Davies et al., 2005). However, the most usual form of betting, especially for small 
investors, is still through bookmakers, that year after year, continue being successful. 
For the porpoises of this work, as long as our aim is to confirm the hypothesis that due to 
higher adverse selection costs, women’s tennis games should exhibit higher “over-rounds” 
or spreads, betting exchanges will be intentionally excluded from the analysis.  
2.3. Odds and prices in bookmaker’s markets 
In betting markets, the traded instruments are bets. As it happens with derivatives in financial 
markets, bets represent a contingent contractual claim on a future cash flow (Flepp et al., 
2017). Put another way, bets are rights that could possibly arise (at the moment that the 
outcome is known) to demand future cash flows. With contingent, the intention is to express 
that is subject to change.  
At the same time, the cash flow is influenced by two different parameters: the outcome of 
the underlying asset, and the price of the contract or the odds (Sauer, 1998). In this regard, 
if the bookmakers set a price p for a concrete event, the probabilities that the bookmaker 
assigns to each event are also displayed (Probability of an event = 1/pevent). Remember that 
the bookmaker determines the probability of an event and it takes the opposite position in 
every transaction (Franck et al., 2010). In this extent, Forrest and Simmons (2008), and Levitt 
(2004) used bookmaker’s quotes to calculate the probabilities of victory, and Hvattum (2013) 
and Sauer (1998) also made use of them to understand how the markets work. 
The probabilities are public before the event takes place, “ex ante”, and they evolve through 
time. Furthermore, the investor has the possibility to accept the quote or to refrain at every 
moment before the event is finished. So, in bookmaker’s markets, the investors know that 
the bookmaker is always on the other side of the bet, ensuring payments (Elizalde, 2015), 
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and as in financial markets, bookmakers change the price of an event when new information 
is available to the public (a goal, a major injury, or an event that may have an influence on 
the final result of the game).  
Regarding the gains of the bookmaker, the way of calculating them will vary depending on 
the strategy that the firm decides to take: If the probabilities are solely based on the real 
probabilities of the event (imagine that p represent the fundamental value of an event), the 
bookmaker will win, on average, a benefit equal to the over-round that is imposed to market 
participants (in the analogous way in which market-makers obtain their benefit from bid-ask 
spreads). However, if the bookmaker is able to guarantee the same volume of bets against 
and in favor of an event, the bookmaker will always be able of paying the successful investors 
with the unsuccessful ones, and in consequence, win the over-round in every occasion, 
without any regard to the outcome. Nevertheless, if we tend to infinity, the bookmaker’s 
profit will be equal in both ways. 
In tennis games, if the spread is not taken into consideration, the quoted probability (the 
inverse of the odds) that player x or player y have to win the game is 100%, and therefore, 
this should be reflected in the prices. In other words, if the bookmaker pays 2,5€ for every 
euro invested in the victory of player x (1/2,5=40%), it needs to pay (1/0,6) 1.67€ for every 
euro invested in the victory of y (only two possible outcomes, the victory of player y or x). 
Being more precise, as long as the assigned probability of winning the game is higher for 
player y, player y will be the favorite. On the other hand, player x will be the long shot. So, 
as it can be observed in the previous example, betting firms establish higher prices for bets 
in favor of the favorite. However, as their goal is to obtain a profit, the outcome of the event 
is uncertain, and information asymmetries could be present in the market, bookmakers 
always include a spread (over-round) in their quotes.  
Extending the previous example, imagine that the bookmaker takes the decision to include 
a 5% over-round into the quotes (distributed equally). In this situation, the quotes will be the 
following: 
2.5/1.05 = 2.38 for player x 
1.67/1.05 = 1.59 for player y 
As it can be seen, if the implied probability is calculated, (1/2.38095) %42 + (1/1.59) %62.9, 
the sum is approximately 105%. This 5% is known as the over-round. 
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[1] 
So, the over-round can be defined as a price indicator that reflects the probability percentage 
that is above 1. Put another way, the over-round is the inverse sum of the prices of the 
different outcomes that exist in an event. The over-round is strictly positive, and it only takes 
negative values (sure bets) when an error is in between. In that way, the bigger the over-
round is, with all the rest equal, the more profit for betting firms, and the less for bettors.   
In this extent, Hvattum (2013) suggested that the competitive positioning of bookmakers, 
along with the information that they have, are essential to understand how over-rounds are 
constructed. In mathematical terms, as it has been highlighted, the over-round is the 
difference between the sum of the inverse of the odds and one: 
 
𝜆𝑚𝑖 = Σ𝑗 (
1
𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑗
− 1) 
m stands for match m, i stands for bookmaker i, and j refers to the odd status (player x wins 
or player y wins). So, without further prove, it can be said that the shorter the odds, the higher 
the over-round, and consequently, the higher the margin of the bookmaker (Deschamps and 
Gergaud, 2007). 
In this context, a widely studied phenomena in betting markets is the Favorite-Longshot Bias 
(FLB hereafter), or the tendency to overvalue “longshots” and undervalue favorites (see Cain 
et al., 2010; Williams and Paton, 1997). Put another way, the FLB is the longstanding 
empirical regularity that betting odds provide biased estimates of the probabilities of the 
sports’ outcomes; longshots are over bet, while favorites are under bet (Snowberg and 
Wolfers, 2010). In consequence, empirical evidence indicates that betting on the favorite is a 
much better idea than betting on the long shot. For example, in the long run, losing 5% by 
betting on the favorite, but losing 40% on longshots is not uncommon (Sobel and Raines, 
2003). However, people remain ignoring the evidence and willingly betting on the long shot. 
Risk-loving behavior, misperceptions of probabilities, and irrational behavior are some of 
the possible answers to this phenomenon that can be found in the literature. In order to 
better understand the FLB, see the following example: 
As we have seen in the previous illustration, quotes change from 2.5 (for player x) and 1.67 
(for player y) to 2.38 and 1.59 when a 5% over-round is included (assuming that the margin 
is equally spread across each player). However, especially when a clear favorite exists, this is 
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not what happens. In betting markets, in terms of margin percentage, the over-round is 
distributed unequally, and therefore, quotes like the following are easier to find: 
1.67/1.01 = 1.653 
2.5/1.1126 = 2.247 
 
The spread is still 5%, (1/1.653) 60.5% + (1/2.247) 44.5%, but the implicit probability of 
victory of the long shot is now overvalued (42% vs 44,5%). The FLB is more pronounce in 
markets with higher trading volumes, heavier attention on the favorite, and less sophisticate 
and informed investors (Abinzano et al., 2017). Finally, it is important to mention that the 
FLB is inconsistent with the widely known decision-making model that Kahneman and 
Tversky presented in 1979, when they affirmed that a natural tendency to avoid a loss rather 
than make a gain exists among humans (also known as loss aversion). 
 
3. VARIABLES THAT AFFECT PRICE FORMATION 
Price formation in betting markets have two distinctive characteristics. First, unlike in 
financial markets, sports bets are completely idiosyncratic, meaning that they have no relation 
to any risk premia or aggregate risk (Moskowitz, 2015). Remember that in the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model developed by Sharpe (1964), the choice between the potential risk and return 
of a portfolio is explained by the risk premium that investors bear. Furthermore, as Williams 
(1999) mentioned, in contrast to stocks, the contract of a sport bet is related to a single event, 
and in consequence, is not subject to other considerations as the future performance or the 
future cash flows. Second, sports contracts are very short in time, and in consequence, as 
uncertainty disappears very quickly, mispricing can be easily detected (Moskowitz, 2015). 
When considering market efficiency of sport betting markets, it must be taken into account 
that betting is a zero-sum game, where bookmakers try to earn a profit in the long run. So, 
if bettors are able to make a profit, the prices cannot be considered as efficient, as long as it 
can be inferred that all bettors or bookmakers are not well informed (Sauer, 1998). 
In this sense, sports betting contracts should be, in theory, subject to the same behavioural 
tendencies or biases that influence market anomalies in financial markets. Barberis and Thaler 
(2003) defined behavioural finance as the study of how irrational behaviour influences 
market prices (deviation of rational thinking and exposure to unnecessary risks), moving 
them from their intrinsic values. Furthermore, the rational expectation utility model is 
constructed around generic risky gambles, so it should apply for both, sports bets and capital 
market securities. On this subject, Franck et al. (2010) suggested that the presence of 
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irrational bettors can lead bookmakers to bias their betting odds. However, the authors 
recognized the existence of large gaps in the analysis of the impact of trading on price setting, 
as obtaining information on trading activity is still complicated. 
Regarding price formation in betting markets, Elizalde (2015) mentioned that among others, 
two main factors stand out in the process: Information and liquidity.  
On the one hand, the possibility of facing better informed market participants influences 
prices. Thanks to information asymmetries, bettors may have advance information on the 
fundamental value of the asset, and in consequence, they may be able to obtain an easy profit. 
Hence, bookmakers must consider the probability to encounter with a better-informed 
bettor as a counterparty, and therefore, of incurring in loses. Remember that the bookmaker 
obtains a benefit when is trading against worse informed investors and from the bid-ask 
spread, so, if more better-informed investors are active in the market, the bid-ask spread also 
increases, worsening price discovery.  
Furthermore, following the same logic, bet prices also suffer alterations when new 
information arrives to betting markets. In this way, if a sufficient number of bets of the same 
outcome are accepted, the bookmaker protects itself modifying its quotes (reducing the price 
and therefore increasing the implicit probability of the outcome). The same happens if 
enough bets (with contrarian outcome) are accepted. Take into account that in the analysis  
presented in the next lines, only two possible outcomes exist (either player x or y wins), so 
modifications on the price of x (the amount of euros that will be obtained for every euro 
invested in the victory of x), implicitly represent a change in the probability that the 
bookmaker assigns to the victory of player y. So, as bookmakers change their expectations 
on the value of the asset with the arrival of new information, quotes on the victory of player 
x and y will be changing, depending on the volume of bets that each player receives.  
Moreover, as long as the outcome is more uncertain, the over-round is higher for games that 
are played on first rounds and in low level tournaments. This happens because the 
bookmaker’s possibilities of suffering an undesirable outcome increases in these situations, 
as other investors may have more concrete or better information about the health of the 
players, how motivated they are, or if they have had any family issue recently (further 
explanations about the phenomena are given in following sections [4] and [5]). In other 
words, the over-round, that can be interpreted as an analogous of the bid-ask spread, will be 
higher when private information is not reflected in the prices. Remember that the bid-ask 
spread is an accepted measure of liquidity costs, and that as part of its framework, Fama 
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(1970) highlighted the notion of an efficient market, underwriting that an efficient market is 
a market in which securities’ prices reflect all available information. In this extent, if the 
bookmakers increase the over-round in order to mitigate loses from information 
asymmetries, it can be said that the efficient-market hypothesis is rejected for bookmaker 
markets.  
On the other hand, liquidity, or to allow assets to be bought and sold at stable prices, also 
affects price formation in betting markets. This is better understood with an example: 
In betting markets, liquidity varies depending on the type of game. Put another way, the 
maximum number of euros that can be bet on the outcome of an event changes with the 
market of the respective game and its depth. As an example, is not the same to place a bet in 
the Roland Garros final, where the maximum permitted bet will be above 10000€, or to place 
a bet in the first round of Pune (ATP 250), where the maximum bet will be around 200€. So, 
limitations to execute the desired bet also vary depending on the market of the game. This is 
again connected with the fact that bookmarkers have the need to protect themselves against 
frauds created by information asymmetries. Regarding prices, if the market depth is thin, a 
small order may be sufficient to alter the price of an outcome (e.g. player x or y wins). 
All in all, Moskowitz (2015) suggested that betting firms set an initial price or line on each 
contract. These initial prices are established in order to maximize their benefits, considering 
risks, and equalizing the dollar bets on each side of the contract. With this method, betting 
firms receive the spread with no risk exposure. However, if bookmarkers are on average 
better than gamblers at predicting results or betting volumes, they also have the possibility 
of increasing their risk exposure, and therefore, of increasing their profits. Once the initial 
price is established, as betting volume flows, the initial price is subject to variations when 
bookmakers try to balance their risk exposure. On the other hand, bettors also have the 
possibility to bet before and during the game, and as a result, until the final closing price is 
established, they constantly try to exploit mispriced quotes (old quotes that do not reflect an 
injury, the mood of the players, or other circumstances that can influence the result of the 
match ). 
 
4. HYPOTHESIS 
As it has been mentioned in previous lines of the work, the objective of this paper is to 
determine if the over-round is higher in WTA games than in ATP games, understanding at 
the same time, which are the possible triggers behind this difference.  
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In this extent, the null hypothesis (H0) is that bookmakers impose the same over-round in 
WTA and ATP games. However, as our main hypothesis is that due to higher information 
asymmetries, women’s tennis games should exhibit higher over-rounds than men’s tennis 
games, we expect to reject the null hypothesis. 
The selection of tennis as the test group is based on two main reasons: First, there are many 
players on the ATP and WTA tour, a large number of games are played during a season, 
there are no draws, and as Forrest and McHale (2007) mentioned, the structure of the 
tournaments facilitates matches between players with very different rankings, thus leading to 
a wide range of available odds. Second, abundant public information about professional 
tennis players and tournaments is publicly available, easing the extraction of conclusions. 
So, the logic behind the main hypothesis works in the following way: Public information 
about female tennis players is less accessible for bettors, as the WTA world tour receives less 
media attention, attendance to WTA tennis games is lower, and in consequence, less 
resources are devoted to trace the circuit. This creates an environment where private 
information is easier to obtain for investors (in comparison to the ATP circuit), and in 
consequence, bookmakers face a higher risk of suffering adverse selection costs. In other 
words, it is more plausible for an investor to obtain an information that the bookmaker does 
not receive. 
The following graph illustrates the worldwide web search interest relative to the highest point 
on the chart for a given time. The graph has been obtained from Google Trends and a value 
of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. As it can be seen in the graph, the term ATP (in 
blue) arouses more interest in terms of searches than the WTA (in red) for the whole period. 
This is consistent with the believe that more information is available for male tennis, and in 
consequence, market participants are in general better informed, leaving less room for 
profitable private information.  
 
Figure 1. Public interest on the ATP circuit vs the WTA circuit. Source: Google Trends. 
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The same pattern repeats if we look to television audience measurements or to the number 
of bets placed in each tournament. As an example, in the year 2015, the ATP circuit had 973 
million viewers in comparison to the 395 million viewers that the WTA circuit had. 
Furthermore, in the year 2016, 351,025 bets were placed at the betting exchange Betfair in 
Wimbledon, of which 23,5696 were placed in games played among men players, and 11,5329 
in games played between female players (see appendix 1). A considerable difference. 
In this extent, if less information is publicly available for WTA players, is not unreasonable 
to think that the chances of facing better-informed bettors than themselves increase for 
bookmakers in the WTA circuit, and in consequence, the spreads will be higher than in the 
ATP circuit. In other words, if the bookmaker does not impose a higher over-round in 
women’s games, their per game gains will be lower than in men’s matches, as the possibilities 
of incorporating private information in the bets, capitalizing the superior information, will 
be higher for bettors. Financial literature has proven that superior information can be used 
to create profitable strategies in price-driven markets (see Grinblatt and Titman, 1994; Daniel 
et al., 1997). 
However, to ensure the meaningfulness of the theory, the difference in the spread (due to a 
higher probability of facing information asymmetries) must occur with the rest of the 
variables equal. So, complying with previous literature, at the time of constructing the 
regression models, other variables that create variations in the over-round have to be 
included; the round number (Lahvička, 2014; Abinzano et al., 2017), the type of tournament 
(Lahvička, 2014; Abinzano et al., 2017), the yearly variations due to technology 
improvements (Hidalgo et al., 2016), the ranking and point differences between the players 
(Lyócsa and Výrost, 2017; Moskowitz, 2015), and if at least one of the players is among the 
best 50 of the world (Lahvička, 2014; Abinzano et al., 2017). If controlling for these variables, 
a significant over-round difference is still appreciable between men’s and women’s tennis 
matches, it can be concluded that the analysis gives favourable evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis that higher information asymmetries create an over-round difference between 
ATP and WTA games, and in consequence, financial and betting markets present major 
similarities at the time of fixing the spreads.  
 
5. DATABASE 
The sample consist on 45,661 tennis matches played on the ATP and WTA world tours from 
2010 to 2018. 23,568 games were played among men, while the other 22,093 games were 
played between women. The data were retrieved from www.tennisdata.co.uk, a source used 
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in a number of studies covering the tennis betting market, e.g. Forrest and McHale (2007), 
Scheibehenne and Bröder (2007), McHale and Morton (2011), Baker and McHale (2013), or 
Brown and Minor (2014). 
The dataset is composed with the basic match information that is meaningful for the purpose 
of this study, including the ranking of the players, the ranking points that each player has, 
the match results measured as the number of games won, the type of tournament, the date 
of the match, the round number, and the closing odds quoted from Bet365 for a given match. 
All the games that had some blank data have been automatically discarded. Also, by applying 
Equation [1], the over-round values for each match have been obtained. 
Regarding the ranking points, it is convenient to remember that they are awarded according 
to the type of tournament and the stage of tournament reached. Furthermore, the rankings 
are updated weekly, so players go up and down in the ranking depending on their 
performance. Being more precise, after every tournament, the rankings drop all the points 
earned in the previous year at the respective tournament and replace them with the points 
won in the just ended contest.  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the over-round for women’s and men’s world tour matches 
from 2010 to 2018. As it can be seen in the data, the over-round has experienced a sharp 
decrease in the last years, both for men and women. This is consistent with the findings of 
Hidalgo et al. (2016) who argued that on average, football bets have experienced an average 
over-round reduction of 40 percent in the last decade. The gradual expansion of online 
betting and the appearance of new competitors, have significantly increased competition 
among sport betting firms, and in consequence, over-rounds have decreased. This is also 
consistent with financial theory.  Among others, Huang (2002), Mayhew (2002), Brogaard et 
al. (2014) and Battalio et al. (1997), obtained favourable evidence suggesting that competition 
in providing liquidity tights the spreads in financial markets.  
Figure 2. Evolution of the average over-round from 2010 to 2018, both for men and women. 
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As shown in Figure 3, the average over-round also varies depending on the month of the 
year that the game takes place, both for men and women. For the purposes of this study, and 
in line with standard financial market practices, December matches have been dropped from 
the sample, as long as the matches played in this month are residual. In this extent, the higher 
over-rounds can be found in the period from February to April, and although a variety of 
variables could create these variations, the scarce number of prestigious tournaments that 
take place in this period in comparison to the rest of the year, emerges as the most plausible 
trigger of the difference. Furthermore, as the period coincides with the months that are 
between the Australian Open and Roland Garros Grand Slams, it could be think that the 
uncertainty regarding the performance and the interest of the players in the tournaments is 
higher than usual. Abinzano et al., (2017) informed about the relevance of market uncertainty 
in the price-setting process. 
Figure 3. Average over-round in the different months of the year (2010-2018). 
 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that the average over-round (in percentage), is lower for men’s 
games than for women’s games. Further evidence will be needed to prove that this difference 
can be in part explained by the higher information asymmetries that bookmakers may 
encounter in the WTA circuit, but at first sight, it is evident that an over-round difference 
exist between the WTA and ATP world tours (6.85% vs 6.69%). Table 1 also shows that the 
over-round decreases with the importance of the tournament, with a considerable difference 
between grand slam tournaments (GS) and the rest. In order to make the results of women 
and men comparable, an equivalence between tournaments have been made, as long as WTA 
and ATP circuits do not share the same tournament hierarchy. For that, monetary rewards, 
stadium attendances, and television audiences have been examined, leading to the following 
equivalences: 
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• ATP 250 and 500 – WTA International 
• ATP Master 1000 – WTA Premier 
• ATP Master Cup – WTA Finals 
 
On this subject, Grand Slam tournaments are almost identical for both sexes, with only one 
significant difference: Women’s matches are played to the best of three sets, while men’s play 
best of five sets. This could create problems at the time of analysing over-round differences 
between female and male GS matches, as the over-round variations may be built on the 
tournament design difference. Further studies may be necessary in the future to understand 
the influence that the tournament design may have on the observed over-round.  
A possible explanation to the over-round difference between GS and non-GS tournaments 
is that players tend to free ride less in GS tournaments, and therefore, suspicious behaviours 
are less frequent. For example, the data shows that male favourites (higher assigned 
probability of victory) won the 77.03% of the GS matches, while they only succeeded in the 
67.95% of the non-GS games. A striking difference that is replicated in women’s games, 
where the favourites won the 71.88% of the games in GS matches, whereas they only 
defeated the long shot at the 65.49% of the times in non-GS matches. Again, the difference 
in the proportion of success between women and men favourites at grand slams, may be 
partially built on the reality that women’s games are played to the best of 3 sets, leaving room 
for more surprising results. However, is also important to mention that from 2010 to 2018, 
with Rafael Nadal, Roger Federer, Novak Djokovic, and Andy Murray, the GS tournaments 
have witnessed an almost tyrannical superiority of these players, while the WTA circuit, by 
not having such superior players except from Serena Williams, has given room for a higher 
number of unexpected GS champions and results. 
The over-round is even smaller in the Master Cup (males) and WTA Finals tournaments 
(5.57% and 5.98%), but due to the particularities that both tournaments entail (only the 
players that are ranked among the top 8 participate), both have been excluded from the 
analysis. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that as players advance in the tournaments, the over-
round decreases gradually, finding the most important differences in the first and the second 
rounds. This could be explained by the fact that bookmakers receive key information in the 
first rounds of the tournament: If the player is taking the tournament seriously, and which is 
her/his physical and emotional condition. Put another way, the bookmaker may suffer more 
exposure to information asymmetries at the early stages of the tournament, and in 
consequence, it increases the over-round. At the same time, more low rank players participate 
 20 
 
 Tournament type 
 2010-2018 250 500 1000 GS MC 
Male 6.69% 6.97% 6.79% 6.75% 5.95% 5.57% 
Female 6.85% 7.03%  6.99% 6.26% 5.98% 
 
in first rounds, and in consequence, as information is scarcer for these players, bookmakers 
protect themselves against loses increasing the over-round. Usually, when the last games of 
the tournaments are played, bookmakers have more information to impound on prices, and 
therefore, the market becomes more efficient. 
Table 1. Average over-round by tournament type (2010-2018). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average over-round by round (2010-2018). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, Table 2 contains the average over-round differences for matches that were played 
between two top 25 players, two players that were ranked among the 25 and the 50, and two 
players that were between the 100 and 500 positions in the ranking. As it can be seen in the 
table, over-rounds are lower when two high ranking players face each other, both for women 
and men tennis players.  
This could be explained by the fact that almost no private information exists on high ranking 
players, and in consequence, bookmakers can accurately predict the fundamental values of 
the bets. Furthermore, a higher volume of bets is received when two top players face each 
other, improving the liquidity of the markets. The logic works as follows: Bettors, as a group, 
are more willing to bet a higher amount of money on both outcomes of the game, and as a 
consequence, bookmakers are more able to balance their risk exposure. This is consistent 
with financial theory, which affirms that stocks and indexes with higher trading volumes have 
narrower bid-ask spreads than those that are infrequently traded, since a broker requires 
more compensation for handling the transaction.  
Table 2. Average over-round by the players ranking position (2010-2018). 
 
 Ranking: 1-25 Ranking: 26-50 Ranking: 100-500 
Male 6.05% 7.26% 7.32% 
Female 6.46% 7.28% 7.40% 
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In short, it seems that the preliminary analysis of the data gives evidence in favour of the 
main hypothesis that the over-round is higher in the WTA circuit, as the over-rounds have 
been higher in every analysed situation. Furthermore, data suggests that bookmaker’s 
exposure to information asymmetries could be key to understand over-round differences.  
 
6. METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Univariate analysis 
As it has been shown in the previous section, differences exist between the sample means 
that have been analysed. However, in order to determine if the disparities between the sample 
means are significant enough to consider that a difference also exist in the population means, 
t test analysis have been conducted. The results of the t-test are also interesting to conclude 
which variables should be included in the model. Put another way, the objective is to 
determine if the average over-rounds of the populations (see male vs female matches, GS vs 
non-GS matches, 1st round vs non 1st round matches…) are different, not just if the sample 
means are dissimilar. Small differences between the sample means may be caused by sampling 
variability. 
In concordance with the preliminary analysis and previous studies (see Lahvicka, 2014; 
Abinzano et al., 2017; Moskowitz, 2015), the tests have been performed for the following 
variables:  
1. Grand Slam vs Non-Grand Slam games (being 1 if the game was a GS game and 0 if 
not) 
2. First round vs Non-First round games (being 1 if the game was a 1st round game and 
0 if not) 
3. At least one player in the top 50 vs No player in the top 50 (being 1 if a top50 player 
was in the game and 0 if not) 
4. ATP games vs WTA games (being 1 if the game was an ATP game and 0 if not) 
The null hypothesis (H0) has always been that both population means are equal, while the 
alternative hypothesis (H1) have sustained that a significant difference exists between the 
average over-rounds of the two populations.  
See the following example: 
1. H0: µGS - µNGS = 0   against   H1: µGS - µNGS ≠ 0 
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 2The Levene tests results can be viewed in Table 3 and in Appendixes 2 and 3.  
In this respect, in order to know if the variances of the populations can be assumed to be 
equal or not, Levene tests have been performed (being H0: the variances of both populations 
are equal). So, as it happens in the cases that we have studied, if the probability associated 
with the Levene statistic (p value) is lower than 0.01, it can be assumed with a 1% significance 
level that the population variances are not the same2. Hence, for the t-test statistics, it has 
been assumed that the population variances are not equal. However, the results are almost 
identical in both cases.  
So, at a 5% significance level, if the two-sided p value or sig. is lower than 0.025, it can be 
said that strong evidence is obtained suggesting that the null hypothesis does not hold, and 
therefore, population means are not equal (µx - µy ≠ 0). The same logic applies if 0 is not 
included in the limits of the confident interval, or if the calculated t values are lower or higher 
than the critical t values at a 5% significance level and x degrees of freedom. 
6.2 Regression analysis 
The following lines describe the methodology used to analyse the over-round variations in 
the betting firm Bet365. As our aim is to compare the over-round evolution and see if, ceteris 
paribus, the over-round is higher for female professional tennis games than for male ones, 
basic linear regression models have been used. First, an OLS have been constructed for ATP 
games, then, the same procedure has been replicated for WTA matches, and finally, a general 
model has been developed, where matches from both categories have been included. In this 
last model, in order to see if more probable information asymmetries create a higher over-
round in women’s games, a dummy variable, DATPi, has been included (1 if the game is an 
ATP game, 0 if not). If our main hypothesis holds (and therefore the null hypothesis is 
rejected), DATPi has to present a negative coefficient, and of course, it needs to be 
significant.  
Furthermore, in line with previous findings and standard procedure in the literature (see 
Hidalgo et al., 2016; Lahvicka, 2014; Abinzano et al., 2016), the study variable (the over-
round) has been included as the dependent variable, while a mix of dummy and continuous 
variables have been included as independent variables, in order to control for other forces 
(apart from a higher probability of facing information asymmetries in the WTA circuit) that 
could affect the over-round. The regression models will therefore be estimated including the 
following variables: 
Regarding continuous variables, two have been included: The points difference between the 
players in absolute terms (Points dif.), and the “World Tour” ranking difference, also in 
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[2] 
[3] 
absolute terms (Rank dif.). Both are proxies that reflect the difference in the skills or level of 
the players, but as long as no multicollinearity problems have emerged, it has been decided 
to include both in the model. Consider that in the presence of high multicollinearity, 
confidence intervals tend to become very wide, and in consequence, null hypothesis are more 
difficult to reject. These problems have not turned out in our analysis.  
On the other hand, regarding dummy variables, 12 have been included:  
• DGSi, which takes the value of one when the game is a Grand Slam game, and 0 if 
not. The logic says that the variable should have a negative coefficient, as long as 
more information is available on GS tournaments, the players tend to free ride less, 
and all the top players participate in the event.  
• DT50i, which takes the value of one when a at least one of the game participants is 
ranked in the best 50 tennis players, and 0 if not. Again, common sense predicts that 
the coefficient of the variable should be negative, as more information is public for 
top players, and bookmakers have less doubts about their performance.  
• D1Ri, which takes the value of one if the match is a first-round game and 0 else ways. 
First round matches should exhibit higher over-rounds (as explained in section [5]), 
so the direction of the variable should be positive. Put another way, the bookmakers 
protect themselves in a greater extent in the first round, as uncertainty is higher, and 
less information is available.  
• ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 , which take the value of one if the game was played in the respective year 
(0 if not), and control for progressive decreases in the over-round due to technology 
improvements and an increase in competition (see Hidalgo et al., 2016). In order to 
prevent perfect multicollinearity, we have omitted the year 2010, which has been 
taken as the reference category. Moreover, as long as online platforms are constantly 
improving and expanding, the variables should exhibit negative coefficients, that 
should be even more negative as years go by (the over-round in 2011 was smaller 
than in 2010, the over-round in 2012 was smaller than 2011 etc.). 
So, the models are: 
ATP Over-roundi = α1 + α2DGSi + α3D1Ri + α4DT50i + β5Points dif.i + β6Rank dif.i 
+ ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 αi  + εi 
WTA Over-roundi = α1 + α2DGSi + α3D1Ri + α4DT50i + β5Points dif.i + β6Rank dif.i 
+ ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 αi  + εi 
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[4] 
General Over-roundi = α1 + α2DGSi + α3D1Ri + α4DT50i + α5ATPi + β6Points dif.i 
+ β7Rank dif.i + ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 αi + εi 
 
7. RESULTS 
7.1 Univariate analysis 
In order to determine if significance differences exist between the sample means, a univariate 
analysis of the data has been conducted, as described in the previous section. In this part of 
the study we have not deal with causes or relationship, and the sole intention of the analysis 
has been to determine if the disparities between the sample means are significant enough to 
assume that a difference also exist in the population means. 
The results that are presented in Table 3 include data from both, women’s and men’s tennis 
matches, but the tests have also been replicated analysing both samples independently 
(women’s and men’s matches), with identical results (see Appendix 2 and 3). As it can be 
seen in Table 3, the null hypothesis (the over-round mean of the populations is equal) is 
rejected in each of the cases, leading us to the following conclusions. 
 Table 3. Levene tests for equality of variances and T-tests for equality of over-round means. 
 
Regarding the mean over-round for Grand Slam and non-Grand Slam tournaments, the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at a 1% significance level, meaning that there are strong evidence 
suggesting that an over-round difference exists between the two populations. The mean 
difference is negative, meaning that GS have lower over-rounds than the rest of the 
 Levene test for equality of variances T-test for equality of over-round means 
F T- test Mean dif. 
Male/Female σ2M = σ2F 55.463 * -13.550 * - 0.001566296 
σ2M ≠ σ2F  -13.563 * - 0.001566296 
GS/ NGS σ2GS = σ2NGS 541.459 * -59.215 * -0.008269882 
σ2GS ≠ σ2NGS  -53.749 * -0.008269882 
1R / N1R σ21R = σ2N1R 336.037 * 42.704 * 0.0048633818 
σ21R ≠ σ2N1R  42.887 * 0.0048633818 
T50 / NT50 σ2T50 = σ2NT50 593.141 * -54.846 * -0.006985752 
σ2T50 ≠ σ2NT50  -58.702 * -0.006985752 
* represents that the tests are significant at a 5% significance level 
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tournaments. Therefore, if the game takes place on a GS or not is something to be considered 
in our model. 
The same logic applies when we analyse the over-round for matches that had at least one 
player in the top 50. The mean difference is again negative and the null hypothesis can be 
rejected at a 1% significance level, suggesting that the over-round is higher when a top 50 is 
not in the game. The reasoning behind these differences is the one that have been explained 
in section [5], and again, if a top50 player is or not in the game, has to be considered at the 
time of constructing the econometric model. 
On the other hand, the mean difference is positive for matches that have been played on the 
first round. What is more, a significant over-round difference exists among the first-round 
games and the rest, rejecting the null hypothesis at a 1% significance level. The t-test result 
makes perfect sense, as long as bookmakers receive important information in the first round 
of the tournaments, as it has been mentioned earlier.  
Finally, the null hypothesis that the over-round is equal in women’s and men’s tennis matches 
is also rejected at a 1% significance level. Put another way, there are strong evidence 
suggesting that an over-round difference exist between women’s and men’s tennis games. 
The mean difference is negative, so bookmarkers impose lower over-rounds in games played 
by male tennis players. This means that there is room for analysis in this field, and in 
consequence, our main hypothesis may be correct. However, the fact that a significance over-
round difference exists in female and male tennis matches does not prove anything per se. 
In consequence, in the model that is presented in the next lines, an attempt is made to control 
for other variables that may have an influence in the over-round, analysing if controlling for 
these variables, the disparities persist. However, for the future, in order to give more strength 
to the hypothesis that more frequent information asymmetries are the trigger of these 
differences, it may be interesting to find an information asymmetry proxy, and see if indeed, 
the logic applies.  
7.2 Regression analysis                                                                                                            
After conducting the estimation using the OLS method, three linear regression models have 
been obtained, which have confirmed the intuitions discussed in the paper. In the following 
lines, a deep overview of the results is carried out. 
All three models exhibit similar characteristics (see the results on Table 4). As expected, the 
over-round is lower when the game takes place in a GS, one of the players is ranked among 
the best 50 tennis players of the world, the match is not a first-round game, and the ranking 
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and points differences are higher. Furthermore, the control variables that have been 
introduced to limit the effects that technology improvements and the increase in competition 
have had in the over-round, also show negative coefficients, result that enforces the idea that 
the over-round has followed a decreasing pattern in the last decade, driven by the evolution 
of the above-mentioned factors. 
 Table 4. Results of the models using the ols method. 
 
The only remarkable difference between the models that try to explain the over-round 
variation in WTA and ATP games is that, although the constant term has the same value, the 
over-round decreases in a greater extent in the WTA circuit when the match is played on a 
GS tournament and the points difference is higher. However, on the contrary, the ranking 
difference has a more negative coefficient in the ATP circuit. A possible explanation for this 
apparently contradicting result may be the following: In the male circuit, although two players 
VARIABLE ATP MODEL  WTA MODEL  GENERAL MODEL  
Constant 0.078 * 0.078 * 0.079 * 
DATP     - 0.01 * 
DGS - 0.006 * - 0.007 * - 0.007 * 
D1R 0.002 * 0.002 * 0.002 * 
DT50 - 0.002 * - 0.002 * - 0.002 * 
Rank dif. - 0.00001863 * - 0.00001636 * - 0.00001719 * 
Points dif. - 0.000002296 * - 0.000002524 * - 0.000002453 * 
D2011 - 0.002 * - 0.001 * - 0.001 * 
D2012 - 0.005 * - 0.005 * - 0.005 * 
D2013 - 0.005 * - 0.004 * - 0.005 * 
D2014 - 0.005 * - 0.005 * - 0.005 * 
D2015 - 0.005 * - 0.004 * - 0.005 * 
D2016 - 0.005 * - 0.005 * - 0.005 * 
D2017 - 0.007 * - 0.007 * - 0.007 * 
D2018 - 0.007 * - 0.007 * - 0.007 * 
ADJ R2 0.395  0.260  0.333  
*represents that the variable is significant at a 5% significance level 
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[5] 
may be very close in terms of ATP points, a significant difference exists between the level 
that both players have, meaning that the player with the highest ranking is usually the one 
that obtains the victory. This generates less uncertainty for the bookmaker at the time of 
quoting the odds, especially in face to faces matches with minor rank differences. On the 
other hand, in the WTA World Tour, the level of the players is more even, and in 
consequence, the raking of each player has less importance. Put another way, in women’s 
tennis, if both players have similar world tour points, the result is more uncertain than in 
men’s tennis, and in consequence, the points difference is more important than the ranking 
itself. Being more precise, data shows that the player with the best ranking wins the game the 
66.37% of the times in the ATP circuit, while in the WTA circuit, the percentage decreases 
to 64.71%. Because of that, for forthcoming studies, it may be interesting to include 
interactions terms to the model, as adding interactions to a regression can greatly increase 
the understanding among the variables in the model, allowing to test hypothesis with greater 
robustness. Put another way, the possibility to analyse if higher adverse selection costs have 
a more or less pronounce effect on the over-round when the game takes place on a GS or 
not, when the match is a first-round game or not, or when a top 50 player is in the game or 
not, among others, would be real. That is, the presence of a significant interaction would 
indicate that the effect of the explanatory variables in the over-round is different when the 
dummy ATPi takes the value of 1. The new regression equation would be the following: 
 
Int. General Over-roundi = α1 + α2DGSi + α3D1Ri + α4DT50i + α5ATPi + β6Points 
dif.i + β7Rank dif.i + ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 αi  + α14(DGSiATPi) + α15(D1RiATPi) + 
α16(DT50iATPi) +  β7(Points dif.iATPi) + β8(Rank dif.iATPi) + εi 
 
Going back to the original model, regarding the dummy variable DGSi, the following may 
occur: As we have been predicting since the beginning of the paper, public information on 
female tennis players is scarcer and more difficult to find. Because of that, when female 
players participate in a Grand Slam, and media coverage increases exponentially, the extra 
information that bookmakers obtain in comparison to other less renown tournaments is 
higher in women’s tennis than in men’s tennis. In consequence, bookmakers are able to 
impound more information into prices, decreasing the over-round and making markets more 
efficient. Regarding the R2 coefficients, it has to be mentioned that the same model is able 
to explain the 39.5% of the over-round variability in the ATP circuit, while it only explains 
the 26% of the over-round variability in the WTA. This supports our ideia that differences 
exist in the over-round formation between ATP and WTA games. 
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Furthermore, in the estimation of model three, where data from both women’s and men’s 
tennis matches is used, the coefficient of the dummy variable, DATPi, is negative. This means 
that with all the rest equal, male tennis matches exhibit lower over-rounds in betting 
platforms (a more in deep analysis of the DATP variable will be provided in section [8]).  
In order to give an illustration of how the estimated models should be interpreted, see the 
interpretation of model [4] (models [2] and [3] can be read in the same way, with the 
exception of the dummy variable, DATP, that does not exist in these models): 
If the match did not take place on a Grand Slam, if it was not a first-round match, if it was 
played by two female players that were below the 50th position in the ranking, if it took place 
in 2010, and no points and ranking difference existed between the players, the model predicts 
that the over-round of that match had to be 0.079. However, as no match with these 
characteristics took place (two players cannot have the same ranking position), the value of 
the model resides in the interpretation of its parameters. Take into account that when two 
players have the same amount of world tour points, the tie is break considering the following 
factors in order of importance; the quantity of points that have been obtained in GS or 
Master 1000 tournaments, and the number of tournaments needed to obtain that quantity of 
points.  
In this way, the model forecasts that with all the rest equal, the over-round decreases 0.007 
points when the game is played on a Grand Slam. Furthermore, as long as the p value is 
0.000 (see Appendix 6) we can reject the null hypothesis that α2= 0 at 1% significance level. 
So, there is evidence that the over-round is lower in GS games, and as a result, DGSi should 
be added to the model. Put another way, DGSi is statistically significantly different from zero. 
The reasoning behind the direction of this variable is the same explained in previous sections.  
Regarding D1Ri, the direction of the variable is positive. In other words, ceteris paribus, the 
over-round is 0.002 higher when the match takes place on the first round. Moreover, at a 1% 
significance level, we reject the null hypothesis that α3 is equal to 0 (p value is 0.000) and in 
consequence, as long as it has a significant influence at the time of explaining the variability 
of the over-round, D1Ri is also included in the model,. 
DT50i is also significant with a 99% confidence level, and it predicts that, other things being 
equal, the over-round is 0.002 lower when a at least one of the best 50 tennis players of the 
world is in the game. Apart from the reasons already mentioned, the players that are ranked 
among the best 50 tennis players of the word have higher incentives to maintain their raking, 
and in consequence, less reasons to free ride. It is convenient to remember that in terms of 
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earnings from advertising agreements, tournament prizes, or international prestige, an 
important difference exists between the best players and the rest. 
In relation to the points and ranking differences, the model specifies that the over-round 
decreases in 0.00001719 points when the ranking difference increases in one unit, while the 
negative effect is 0.000002453 for each point difference between the players. Both variables 
are significant at a 99% confidence level, and the logic behind the direction of the two 
variables is quite intuitive: The higher the ranking and point differences are, the more 
noticeable will be the level or skill differences between the players, imposing less uncertainty 
and a lower probability of transacting with better informed counterparties to the bookmaker 
when quoting the odds. The transcendence of the variables may seem insignificant at first 
sight, as the coefficient of the variables are small, but nothing could be further from the 
truth. As an example, the point difference between Stephanos Tsitsipas (tenth position in 
the ranking) and Lucas Pouille (thirtieth) was of 1985 points (3160-1265) at the 18th of march, 
2019. That means that ceteris paribus, the points difference decreases the over-round in 
1985*0.000002453 = 0.004869205, for the reasons explained above. A considerable 
variation. So, it can be concluded that Points dif.i and Rank dif.i are explicative and significant, 
and in consequence, they should be included in the model. The problems that may arise from 
the non-linearity of ATP points will be examined in more advance sections of the paper. 
Finally, regarding the dummy variables ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011 , the null hypothesis (αi = 0) is rejected in 
every case, at a 1% significance level. The reason to include these control variables is to 
exclude alternative explanations while testing the hypothesis that higher information 
asymmetries motivate a higher over-round in the WTA circuit. Put another way, the inclusion 
and interpretation of the control variables is therefore theoretically motivated, rather than 
statistically. 
7.3 Discussion 
In order to avoid any hasty conclusion, it may be convenient to analyse if the model is 
correctly specified in advance. For that, in the next lines, an overview of the model is done, 
detecting possible problems that the model could have. 
First, the models do not present any inconsistency with economic theory or common sense. 
All the variables exhibit logical directions, and their interpretation does not contradict 
previous studies in this field (see Abinzano et al., 2017; Flepp et al., 2015; Gomber et al., 
2008; Elizalde, 2015). In other words, the models are data admissible and all the predictions 
are logically possible. 
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 Const. DGS DT50  D1R Rank dif. Point dif. DATP  Fav. prob. ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011   
β 0.113 -0.005 0.000 0.003 -0.000002106 -0.0000009464 -0.01 -0.052  
Yes t 339.432 -46.708 -34.266 -2.363 -4.926 -35.421 -8.889 -29.561 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DW=1.444 R2=0.486 Adjusted  R2=0.485 
Furthermore, the coefficients of the variables show constancy when they are individually 
added to the model, and no one is excluded from it when the computer performs a stepwise 
regression or “data mining”. In other words, if we estimate 13 different models, adding an 
extra variable for each one of them, the coefficients do not experiment any significant 
changes or direction variations. The overall significance of the model has been also studied, 
imposing the null hypothesis that ∑ α𝑖
15
𝑖=1  is equal to 0. So, by assessing multiple coefficients 
simultaneously, it can be affirmed that the fit of the intercept-only model is lower than the 
general model (F value 1627.207 and p value 0.000). 
The R2 coefficient of the general model is 0.333. Put another way, the model explains the 
33.3% of the over-round variability in Bet365 bookmaker’s market. In this sense, concerns 
regarding the goodness of the fit may be logical at first instance, but as our intention is 
focused on determining if a significant over-round difference exist between WTA and ATP 
games, the R2 coefficient is not a crucial indicator. Previous studies that were focused on 
studying the significance of a dummy variable also showed low R2 coefficients (see Bladh 
and Sandberg, 2013; Casado et al., 2011). Take into account that if the model explains the 
majority of the over-round’s variability, the possibility of making accurate predictions in 
betting markets would be real, and in consequence, easy profits could be obtained. Thus, a 
low R square coefficient is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis. In this extent, the 
same problem arouses with the Durbin-Watson coefficient, as the general model exhibits a 
Durbin-Watson coefficient of 1,6.  
So, in order to see if the introduction of a new variable changes the main conclusions of this 
work, a new linear regression model has been estimated, including the implicit probability of 
the favourite (1/pfavourite) as a new variable. The implicit probability of the favourite has been 
already used in several betting market studies, including Abinzano et al. (2017) and Deutscher 
et al. (2017). Table 5 shows the results of the estimation. 
Table 5. Results of the new model (including Fav. prob.) using the ols method. 
 
 
 
With the introduction of the new variable, Fav. prob.i, which measures the level of 
uncertainty of the game (less uncertainty for higher implicit probability 1/pfavourite), the general 
model suffers some considerable changes. First, the estimation shows that a 1% increase in 
the implicit probability of the favourite decreases the over-round by 0.052*(1/100)=0,00052. 
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Second, the dummy variable DT5Oi becomes insignificant at a 1% significance level. Third, 
other variables see their coefficients slightly altered: DGSi, Rank dif.i, and Point dif.i exhibit 
less negative coefficients due to the introduction of the new regressor, while the variables 
D1Ri, D2011i, D2016i, D2017i and D2018i suffer the reverse effect.  
However, while the majority of the model’s variables suffer some sort of change, the 
significance and the coefficient of the dummy variable, DATPi, remain invariant. Put another 
way, the introduction of the new variable creates alterations in an otherwise stable model, 
but the direction, significance, and interpretation of the study variable does not change. This 
enforces the view that, although the possibility of omitting a relevant variable in the general 
model cannot be completely discarded, the hypothesis holds even when new regressors are 
considered. In short, the new model still presents evidence suggesting that due to a higher 
probability of facing information asymmetries, bookmakers impose a higher over-round in 
the WTA world tour than in the ATP circuit, replicating what happens in financial markets 
with the bid-ask spread. 
Nevertheless, although the inclusion of the variable Fav. Prob.i could be interesting to 
provide a higher robustness to the results, it also presents serious problems, as endogeneity 
and multicollinearity problems are created in the model. This happens due to the fact that 
the over-round and the implicit probability of the favorite (1/p) are codetermined, with each 
affecting the other. Hence, by estimating either equation by itself, endogeneity is created, and 
as the rest of the explanatory variables linearly predict Fav.Prob.i with a substantial degree of 
accuracy, multicollinearity problems are also revealed. Remember that the over-round is 
calculated by summing the implicit probabilities of the favorite and the long shot and 
subtracting 1 (see Equation [1]). In that way, as long as the downside of the new variable 
(serious simultaneity problems are created) is more evident than the upside, is has been 
decided not to include Fav.Prob.i in the general model. 
On the other hand, the variable Points Dif.i may provoke misspecifications problems, as the 
point distribution in the ATP and WTA world tours is not lineal. Figure 5 illustrates the non-
linearity of the points distributions in tennis rankings, reproducing the ATP raking at the 18h 
of march, 2019. As it can be seen in the graph, the number of points that each player has 
increases dramatically with the first three players of the ranking (Novak Djokovic, Rafael 
Nadal and Alexander Zverev respectively), and in consequence, the variable Points dif. loses 
explanatory power. The exact same thing happens in the WTA circuit. So, with the intention 
of increasing the model’s accuracy, we have transformed the variable Points dif.i into 
ln(Points dif.i). In that way, the highest values of the dataset are compressed, while the lowest 
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ones are expanded, becoming the distribution symmetric.  The results of the new model are 
displayed on Table 6. 
Figure 5. ATP ranking at 18/03/2019. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Results of the model (modifying the specification of Points dif.) using the ols model. 
 
In the transformed model, the interpretation of the variable ln(points dif.i), which is 
significant at a 1% significance level, is the following: Ceteris paribus, a 1% change in the 
points difference between the players, is associated with a decrease in the over-round of 
0.003*0,01 = 0.00003. Put another way, the estimated effect of Points dif.i is no longer linear, 
even though the effect of log(Points dif.i) is linear. 
Again, the only mentionable difference between the original and the new model is that now, 
the variable DT50i is not significance at a 5% significance level. Furthermore, the variable 
DATPi continues being significance with a 99% confidence level, so the specification change 
does not have any effect on the accuracy of our initial prediction. What is more, after the 
adjustment, the estimated coefficient of DATPi is even more negative, being the estimated 
over-round 0.002 lower when the match is an ATP game (with all the rest equal). The rest of 
the variables remain almost invariant, with minor changes. However, as the R2 coefficient is 
even lower in this new model, it can be mentioned that the specification change has not 
improved the goodness of the fit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Const. DGS DT50  D1R Rank dif. Ln(Point dif.) DATP ∑ 𝐷𝑖
2018
𝑖=2011   
β 0.095 -0.007 0.003 0.000 -0.00001064 -0.003 -0.002  
Yes t 300.699 -56.309 23.819 1.678 -21.046 -67.929 -8.684 
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DW=1.642 R2=.0282 Adjusted  R2=0.281 
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8. DTAI CONCLUDING REMARKS 
After the analysis conducted, there are enough evidence to suggest that an over-round 
difference exists between ATP and WTA matches, and consequently, the null hypothesis 
that ATP and WTA games exhibit the same over-rounds can be rejected. The variable DATPi 
is significant in each one of the general models, and even the models [3] and [4] (constructed 
with ATP and WTA data respectively), present evidence suggesting that an over-round 
difference exists between ATP and WTA games. As it has been mentioned in previous lines 
of the work, our main hypothesis is that this dissimilarity is provoked by the higher possibility 
that bookmakers have to encounter better informed counterparties in the women circuit. 
Being more precise, the models estimated in this paper predict that, ceteris paribus, the over-
round is between 0.001 and 0.002 lower in ATP games than in WTA matches, a percentage 
difference of about 2% of the over-round. 
As information for women’s games is less extensive, driven by less media coverage and lower 
stadium attendances among others, private economically meaningful information is easier to 
find, and in consequence, bookmakers must defend themselves from huge loses. Put another 
way, knowledge about women players is lower among market participants, and in 
consequence, as less information is impounded into prices (the markets are less efficient), 
there is more room for the existence of unknown information that escapes the awareness of 
bookmakers. Hidalgo et al. (2016) obtained evidence that supports a parallel conclusion for 
football betting markets, as they found that bookmakers impose higher over-rounds in minor 
and foreign soccer’s leagues. 
These findings are consistent with financial theory, as theoretical models of the bid-ask 
spread hold that a proportion of the bid-ask is based on asymmetric information. Among 
others, Glosten and Harris (1988) found that by discomposing the bid-ask spread into four 
components: Information asymmetries, inventory costs, clearing cost, and monopoly power, 
the hypothesis of information asymmetries as the cause of bid-ask spreads cannot be rejected. 
For the future, it may be interesting to test if bookmaker’s over-rounds can be employed to 
test for an increase in information asymmetries, prior to an anticipated information event, as 
press appearances of the players or open doors trainings. Similar studies in financial markets 
have analysed bid-ask spread variations prior to dividend or earning announcements (see 
Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986). Remember that bookmakers obtain a benefit from trading 
against worse informed investors and from the bid-ask spread, so, if a greater proportion of 
 34 
 
better-informed investors are active in the market (with advance information on the 
fundamental value of the asset) the bid-ask spread will be higher, worsening price discovery. 
So, by obtaining evidence that suggest that due to information asymmetries, and with all the 
rest equal, the over-round is higher in professional women’s tennis games, this article 
approaches the issue of the similarity between financial and betting markets, and it gives 
evidence implying that major similarities exist at the time of quoting the odds, and in 
consequence, of deciding the spreads among financial and betting markets.  
 
9. CONCLUSIONS 
The study presents significance evidence supporting that an over-round difference exists 
between professional women’s and men’s tennis matches. In other words, the findings of 
this paper indicate that financial and betting markets react against adverse selection costs in 
an analogous way, increasing the market spread. However, far from market microstructure 
contributions, the conclusions of this analysis also have a social implication.  
The disparities in the monetary prizes awarded for participating and winning ATP or WTA 
tournaments are notable, except in the case of Grand Slams, where the economic incentives 
are exactly the same. In this sense, tournaments’ organizers defend themselves arguing that 
these differences have their justification in the higher monetary returns that men players 
generate (in the form of greater audiences, greater stadium attendances, or greater television 
coverage). However, one may argue that people’s interest in both circuits is very similar, and 
although there may be audience differences from time to time, these are cyclical and 
changing. Put another way, they depend on the charisma and the tennis level of the players 
of each era, and in consequence, both, women and men tennis players, should have the same 
prizes.  
So, after analysing which are the main factors that drive the over-round differences between 
WTA and ATP games, we can also predict, with an acceptable degree of accuracy, which are 
some of the causes behind the wage gap. In this extent, other scholars as Smith et al. (2006) 
or Hetherington (2006) have affirmed that betting markets create an adequate environment 
for hypothesis testing, even outside the financial world. As an example, Vaughan et al. (2016), 
presented evidence suggesting that betting markets have a more accurate capacity to predict 
electoral processes than polls.  
So, based on our data, and leaving moral implications aside, it can be said that the prize 
differences between men and women tennis players could have a theoretical backing. If men 
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players create more revenues in terms of merchandising, stadium attendances, or television 
audiences, more public information about them would be publicly available and this would 
be reflected in lower over-rounds at betting markets. In some sense, this chain effect would 
have its roots in the higher interest that ATP games theoretically awake. 
In some sense, our study is also built on this assumption, and the empirical research has 
given evidence in favour of this hypothesis, confirming that ceteris paribus, over-rounds are 
lower in the ATP circuit, and pointing adverse selection costs as the most plausible trigger 
of the difference. So, controlling for other variables, it seems that the ATP circuit generates 
a wider media coverage and higher stadium attendances than the WTA circuit, factors that 
drive the difference in both, the over-round and the wage of the players. 
However, there is something of a chicken and egg situation here, since it cannot be affirmed 
if a wider media coverage of ATP games has its root in a higher public interest, or the other 
way around. That is to say, as the accessibility to male tennis has been greater for years, in 
terms of media coverage or advertising for example, fans may have learned to prefer ATP 
games over WTA matches. Further studies in this field will be necessary in the future to 
understand if a cause and effect relationship exists. 
All in all, although at first sight it seems very distant, a deeper understanding of the over-
round could be helpful to figure it out the reasons behind the salary gap, and to stablish 
corrective or preventive measures that could assist in the long road to gender equality in 
sports, and more concretely, in tennis. So, as a final remark, it may be concluded that if more 
resources are devoted to track the professional female circuit, more information on WTA 
players will be public, increasing market efficiency, and decreasing the over-rounds. At the 
same time, as bettors will bear lower transaction costs, betting volumes will also experience 
an upward trend, increasing the revenues generated by the WTA circuit, and thereby, 
reducing the wage gap in professional tennis. As an example, in Grand Slam tournaments, 
where media coverage is considerably higher than in other tournaments for female players, 
prizes for both genders are identical. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. Betfair’s Betting Exchange, Wimbledon 2016 data. 
  Number of bets Volume Volume per game Average bet 
Male  QF 118,176 47,059,922.72 € 11,764,980.68 € 398.22 € 
SF 86,658 36,033,617.93 € 18,016,808.97 € 415.81 € 
F 30,862 14,929,707.55 € 14,929,707.55 € 483.76 € 
Total 235,696 98,023,248.20 € 14,003,321.17 € 415.89 € 
  
Number of bets Volume Volume per game Average bet 
Female QF 64,108 26,354,398.93 € 6,588,599.73 € 411.09 € 
SF 23,623 13,742,385.29 € 6,871,192.65 € 581.74 € 
F 27,598 12,944,270.72 € 12,944,270.72 € 469.03 € 
Total 115,329 53,041,054.94 € 7,577,293.56 € 459.91 € 
 
Appendix 2. Levene tests for equality of variances and T-tests for equality of over-round means (ATP 
data). 
 
Appendix 3. Levene tests for equality of variances and T-tests for equality of over-round means (WTA 
data). 
 Levene test for 
equality of variances 
T-test for equality of over-round means 
F T- test Mean dif. 
GS/ NGS σ2GS = σ2NGS 167,055* -38,103* -0,007463030 
σ2GS ≠ σ2NGS  -35,976* -0,007463030 
1R / N1R σ21R = σ2N1R 90,245* 25,442* 0,0041091435 
σ21R ≠ σ2N1R  25,440* 0,0041091435 
T50 / NT50 σ2T50 = σ2NT50 114,735* -34,061* -0.005889865 
σ2T50 ≠ σ2NT50  -34,878* -0.005889865 
 
 
 
 Levene test for 
equality of variances 
T-test for equality of over-round means 
F T- test Mean dif. 
GS/ NGS σ2GS = σ2NGS 368,603* -46,155* -0.009136136 
σ2GS ≠ σ2NGS  -40,584* -0.009136136 
1R / N1R σ21R = σ2N1R 230,501* 34,442* 0,0055086273 
σ21R ≠ σ2N1R  34,789* 0,0055086273 
T50 / 
NT50 
σ2T50 = σ2NT50 533,788* -43,099* -0.007505703 
σ2T50 ≠ σ2NT50  -48,412* -0.007505703 
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Appendix 4. Results of the model using WTA data (ols method):  
 
Appendix 5. Results of the model using ATP data (ols method): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 β t Sig. 95% confidence interval 
(inferior) 
95% confidence 
interval (superior) 
Constant .078 323.782 .000 .078 .079 
Points dif. -2.524E-6 -80.216 .000 .000 .000 
DGS -.007 -44.283 .000 -.008 -.007 
Rank dif. -1.636E-5 -27.818 .000 .000 .000 
D1R .002 15.212 .000 .002 .002 
DT50 -.002 -14.506 .000 -.003 -.002 
D2011 -.001 -5.081 .000 -.002 -.001 
D2012 -.005 -19.884 .000 -.006 -.005 
D2013 -.005 -19.537 .000 -.006 -.005 
D2014 -.005 -17.554 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2015 -.005 -17.658 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2016 -.005 -19.716 .000 -.006 -.005 
D2017 -.007 -27.710 .000 -.008 -.007 
D2018 -.007 -27.746 .000 -.008 -.007 
 β t Sig. 95% confidence interval 
(inferior) 
95% confidence 
interval (superior) 
Constant .078 296.699 .000 .078 .079 
Points 
dif. 
-2.296E-6 -47.956 .000 .000 .000 
DGS -.006 -33.914 .000 -.006 -.006 
Rank dif. -1.863E-5 -25.088 .000 .000 .000 
D1R .002 15.165 .000 .002 .003 
DT50 -.002 -9.109 .000 -.002 -.001 
D2011 -.002 -5.416 .000 -.002 -.001 
D2012 -.005 -16.359 .000 -.006 -.004 
D2013 -.004 -13.426 .000 -.005 -.003 
D2014 -.005 -15.009 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2015 -.004 -14.429 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2016 -.005 -15.578 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2017 -.007 -21.753 .000 -.007 -.006 
D2018 -.007 -22.335 .000 -.007 -.006 
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Appendix 6. Results of the model using ATP+WTA data (ols method): 
 
 
 β t Sig. 95% confidence interval 
(inferior) 
95% confidence 
interval (superior) 
Constant .079 427,015 .000 .079 .079 
Points 
dif. 
-2.453E-6 -92.143 .000 .000 .000 
DGS -.007 -54.924 .000 -.007 -.006 
Rank dif. -1.719E-5 -37.035 .000 .000 .000 
D1R .002 21.630 .000 .002 .002 
DATP -.001 -14.378 .000 -.002 -.001 
DT50 -.002 -16.055 .000 -.002 -.002 
D2011 -.001 -7.409 .000 -.002 -.001 
D2012 -.005 -25.521 .000 -.006 -.005 
D2013 -.005 -23.124 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2014 -.005 -22.975 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2015 -.005 -22.738 .000 -.005 -.004 
D2016 -.005 -25.022 .000 -.005 -.005 
D2017 -.007 -34.951 .000 -.007 -.007 
D2018 -.007 -35.278 .000 -.007 -.007 
